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KANT'S ETHICS.

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IV.—*The Ethical Principle.*

§ 54. We are conscious of a practical law apriori, says KANT (*Krit. der praktischen Vernunft*), “as we are conscious of theoretic ones: by attending to the necessity with which reason obtrudes them on the mind. And by separating from them all aposteriori conditions, we arrive from the first at the idea of a pure will, as from the last at the notion of a pure understanding.”

Finding herself unable to escape from her unconditional practical law (morality), reason proceeds to abstract, in order to determine its intelligible form. This can be no other than formal; because the content (material objects, phenomenal ends of finite action) can be known only aposteriori and must be abstracted from. And it can be no other than freedom: because if dependent on nature it could connect only phenomena; and the will so (by nature) connected must (by the law of the causal nexus) be itself a phenomenon and known only aposteriori, and must be again abstracted from.

§ 55. If reason is supreme, she must possess a faculty enforcing her command, *id est*, a freedom. Else she were not practical, but merely ideal, a figment of the brain, her supremacy a foolish fancy, her rule an imposture and impotent. (§ 23.)

Absolutely apriori, it may be assumed that there may be a freedom (§ 52); but of this idea nothing can be known and

by it nothing determined. But the fact freedom (abstracted from experience and recognized by consciousness as an apriori fact of reason) is apodictic, and imports the exact function (of will) postulated, and so establishes the supremacy of reason practical. (§ 21.)

Further: abstracting from the fact freedom (a free act in general, which may be figured as a sort of sensible schema), we arrive at the idea freedom, which is apriori and secure, consciousness assuring the datum (fact). (§ 34.)

§ 56. If reason has a faculty of freedom, that faculty must be exercised in pursuance of a law (§ 30), which law reason must declare to every rational agent. That is, every rational agent must have a rule of right and wrong. (§ 20.)

Reason in genere is one and the same reason. Therefore there must be one and the same apriori rule of right and wrong for every rational agent. In other words, the law of freedom is law universal. Theoretically this is an analytical proposition deduced from the idea freedom; but no such theoretical deduction is sufficient to establish the objective validity of the law.

§ 57. But reason commands something (which she declares right) to be done, tolerating no denial of her practical power: hence her rule of right and wrong, adding to the idea freedom existence, is an apriori synthetic proposition apodictic and immediately evident, an original deliverance of reason, "the single isolated fact of practical reason announcing herself as originally legislative"; and as such requires no deduction whatever. (§ 14.)

§ 58. The conclusions herein reached may therefore be stated briefly:

We do not attempt to deduce the supremacy of reason: this she herself exhibits and demonstrates.

We do not require a deduction of the obligation constituted by reason: this she herself commands and enforces. (§ 22.)

The law of reason is therefore a practical principle (rule of action); and with the possibility of the practical principle we set out. (§§ 48 to 51.) We may properly however inquire into the ground of the possibility of the synthesis (§ 57): an exploration not necessary to the validity of the law indeed,

but acceptable to science, which always seeks perfect unity. (§ 16.)

§ 59. The idea morality and the content of experience (matter of sense) are completely heterogeneous, and the former can never be in the latter discovered *aposteriori*. But if no objects can be given in harmony with the idea, morality can only exist as a logical form; which (since it can by hypothesis receive no content) would be mere thought, and could not enter into cognition, and therefore could not belong to understanding (which is the faculty of cognition: § 44). It would be puerile to attach practical value to an idea under which no phenomena could be subsumed.

What then is it which on the one hand, being a pure transcendental determination of sense, of universal objective validity, resting upon a rule *apriori* (the objective validity in sensuous intuition of the original unity of apperception), is homogeneous with the pure intellectual idea; and on the other no less homogeneous with the experimental determinations of the mundus sensibilis, by virtue of its sensible form? This nexus (transcendental schema) must exist in order to constitute the possibility of that synthesis which is involved in every subsumption of a particular duty under the moral law.

“The schema of sensuous conceptions,” KANT says, in his transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment, “is a product and as it were a monogram of the pure imagination *apriori*, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which [*say particular duties*] however can be connected with the conception [*say the law*] only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it [*fulfilment of the law is not possible*: (§ 5)]. On the other hand the schema is something which cannot be reduced into any image; it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category [*required by the idea*] conformably to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representations, in so far as these representations must be conjoined *apriori* in one conception conformably to the unity of apperception.”

§ 60. And again: “The schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category.”

The phenomenon of the idea morality (schema of reason practical) is the rational agent in genere; not abstract *from* the sensible world, but abstract *in* it; indeterminate, though not indeterminable; cleared of all deflection from his own pure law, though nevertheless not delivered *from* the solicitations of the sensory. In other words, THE ETHICAL SCHEMA (analogue of the transcendental schema of the understanding) IS PURE MAN. He who would mark the perfect man and behold the upright, must enter into the kingdom of pure reason: it were vain to search any purgatory, whether comprised in the conception of earth, hell, or heaven.

This ethical schema for the realization of the ethical law, must be distinguished from that (homo noumenon) for the ideal determination of substance in the intelligible world (§§ 36, 38). The former, not being abstract from time, is therein possessed of relations both external and internal, and is very sensible; while its correlate the latter is purely egotistic.

§ 61. We have said (§ 20) that in our relations with the phenomenal world we become conscious of an apodictic fact of reason, morality. Whereupon reason abstracts from experience, bares the *a priori* root, and declares that “every finite intelligent agent has a rule of right and wrong” (dictum of reason: § 56). This is the simplest form in which the rational dictum can be stated; and that every reason does unhesitatingly so formulate it, may be known by the simple observation that even the most ignorant and unreflective will enforce it by pronouncing his (any) individual instance “right because it *is* right” or “wrong because it *is* wrong,” disregarding (or at most appending) any material or ratiocinative support.

Pure reason, in order to make any deduction from this her rule (in other words, in order to found upon it any particular duties), seeks a stricter form; for manifestly in the simple form above given is merely contained an identical proposition: “he who is ruled by reason has the rule of reason.” We inquire what is the rule?

§ 62. Since reason is in genere but one and the same rea-

son, her rule apriori can be but one and the same rule (§ 43). If the rule of a particular reason cannot be the rule of all reason, it is no rule. Therefore actions, in order to conform to the rule of reason, must be in pursuance of a subjective maxim (rule of a particular rational agent) which can be constituted universal law (rule of all rational agents). “**So act that thy maxims of will might become law in a system of universal moral legislation.**” (§ 57.)

§ 63. We have now a form of the rule. But if in the common affairs of life we must make separate inquiry whether each particular act is conformed to so general a rule (a requirement that in practice would speedily become tyrannous and repulsive), it is evident that our moral science is a cathartic of action rather than a tonic. A system of so narrow extent, positive in form but negative in result, would defeat the object of its construction, which is to simplify the process of subsumption and thereby to aid the common judgment in the application of the law.

Since no matter can be known apriori, we seem to be at a loss for any theoretical deductions. Now in the use of reason as an instrument of cognition, we find in the pure sensory schemata through which the notions of the understanding, which would be otherwise wholly impractical, become applicable to the phenomenal world and enter into apriori (though not supersensible) syntheses, thereby constituting the apriori science of pure mathematics. Observing that the use of the same rational faculty as an ethical rule is analogous (the idea being realized only by means of a pure sensible schema : § 59), we infer that similarly (to the mathematical) our ethical science may be extended apriori into the sensible world by virtue of the ethical schema. We accordingly proceed to adopt into the law (as matter for the intelligible form) the pure sensible form, stating the rational agent in genere as the end of the law.

Moreover, the law is of universal validity (§ 62): therefore the rational agent can be required to adopt into his maxim only such matter or end “as may be made imperative on all mankind to design.” This end can be no less necessary than the schema which alone renders possible the realization of the law, and no less universal than the agent who adopts it:

in a word, it can be nothing else than mankind in genere (HUMANITY), abstracted from all subjective peculiarity and idiosyncracy.

The result of 'our bold analogy' is no less surprising than gratifying. For we soon find that we have solved all our practical perplexities, and have easily evolved a broad system of pure deductions as readily applied to human acts as are the rules of mathematics to natural facts: the greater certainty of natural science being rather apparent than real, and due to the different elements of the respective problems.

§ 64. The law of reason, commanding an act, must command also an end: in other words, "THAT which is right" (§ 33), must be stated. Duty is to ACT according to law. But if no matter of duty (end of the maxim) is determinable, how shall we know what it is right to do? For our every act may be within the limits of the law: yet the end which we design may constitute (if effected) a violation of the law. The subjective principle which formulates a design and so shapes the minor rules of action as to approach a given end, is a MAXIM, and must be fit for universal law (§ 62). Now it is clear that if every agent should so act as to produce (though mediately and by the intervention of lawful acts) unlawful results, the aim of the law would be defeated; and that maxim which admits an unlawful end is therefore itself unlawful, not being fit for law universal.

The law therefore must contain (in form) the end; and that end which is contained in law universal is universally commanded: "**Adopt into thy maxims such ends as may be made imperative on all men to design.**"

§ 65. For purposes of subjective guidance, we have now (§§ 62, 64) completely declared the moral law. He who adopts this law of reason as his supreme spring of action and sole motive, does thereby manifestly constitute himself a universal legislator: and so long as he conforms punctually to universal law, he cannot infringe upon (diminish the quantum of) universal freedom. From obedience to his supreme law, he ought not to permit himself to be swerved by any external force whatever. External force put forth (by one subject to the law) against the law is a violation of the law, and an indubitable attack upon universal freedom. Resistance to such

pressure is exactly so far a duty as obedience to the law itself (*id est*, supreme duty); and no man can esteem himself worthy of life if he for an instant hesitates, in pursuance of resistance, to risk and if necessary to sacrifice even life itself. If in effecting resistance (establishing his own freedom in accord with freedom universal) he is himself compelled to attack, to limit, or even to utterly destroy that individual freedom which engages itself in conflict with his personal freedom (and so with freedom universal), he has neither destroyed nor limited nor even attacked that universal freedom which follows upon the universal observance of the law. Nay, more: since there is in genere but one reason, but one law of reason, and necessarily but one freedom, that freedom which assails freedom universal is clearly no freedom; and its destruction is no destruction of freedom and therefore no violation of law: in other words, "the quantum of personal freedom is preserved undiminished throughout the system, in the intercourse and exchange of man with man."—"An obstacle opposed to that which hinders an effect," admirably says KANT, "advances that effect. But everything unjust is a hindrance to freedom according to law universal. Therefore if a certain use of freedom is a hindrance to freedom universal (*id est*, unjust and wrong), then co-action (itself a hindrance to freedom), preventing such misuse of freedom, goes to establish freedom according to a universal law (*id est*, is just and right); and consequently law has in itself a right to co-act him who attempts to violate it."

The law, formulated in accordance with this doctrine, becomes: "**Permit others to use thy humanity only as an absolute end.**"

§ 66. He who adopts the law as his supreme motive, cannot attempt to use the humanity of another as the means toward the attainment of an unjust end; for he cannot himself (by his maxim) design any end in violation of law. (§ 64.)

Hence he who attempts to misuse the humanity of another, does not adopt the law as his ruling spring of action, and must be forcibly restrained from such misuse. But no force is able to compel a rational agent to adopt a MOTIVE. To DESIGN anything is so eminently a free act, that no external compulsion can thrust it upon a free agent. Restraint there-

fore, however just, can extend no further than to the immediate act, and cannot reach the design (end of the maxim). It follows that the co-action of the law cannot enforce the law in its full extent, but only can require that acts shall be not contrary to the law.

So that we divide the law into two parts, governing acts and motives. All actions in accordance with the law are just and lawful: all motives in accordance with the law are right and moral. (§ 2).

§ 67. It is further immediately evident that the law in its relation to motives is the whole law; but the law in relation to actions is a mere fragment of the law. The latter is LAW (JUS) in the narrower sense; and it includes so much of the law as may be externally promulgated and co-acted (externally enforced). An act in accordance with it is termed legal, abstraction being made from all motive or design.

In accordance with this fundamental division of the law, we separate ethical duty into duties moral and legal. Under the former we class the obligation to obey the law in its whole extent: under the latter, the obligation to acts in accordance with law external. Hence all legal duties are moral duties; but only those moral duties are legal whose performance may be externally enforced.

Although every judicial duty ought to be a virtuous office (moral duty), it is convenient to except from the latter class those duties which fall under law external. Those duties which are not legal, but moral only, are therefore the only ones which are treated of as offices of virtue. But it must never be forgotten that this is a division and distinction for mere convenience; and it must not be supposed that the neglect of any legal duty is compatible with morality.

§ 68. The principle of morality is the whole law, and has been formulated already (§ 64.) It remains to give form to so much of the law as shall cover mere legality, and to which all actions may be externally (and, if necessary, by force) conformed. It is needful only to consider that if individual freedom is exerted in violation of the law (external), it is subject to co-action and repression: not otherwise. "Law is therefore the aggregate of those conditions according to which personal choices may harmonize (and not destroy one

another) by being subordinated to freedom's law universal." The supreme principle of law (external) is: "Every action is right and just, whose maxim allows the agent's freedom of choice to harmonize with the freedom of every other, according to a universal law." And since the law commands action (else it were no law), it is duty to "**so act that the use of thy freedom may not circumscribe the freedom of any.**" This is the fundamental principle of every just statute.

§ 69. This rule appears to be negative, requiring of us nothing positive or particular, but only that we refrain from interference with the rights of others. But we discover practically that the spheres of the freedom of intelligent agents intermingle, and that we cannot act at all without in some way limiting the freedom of some other. And this we may also postulate apriori, reflecting that phenomenal intelligent agents exist in a WORLD, which the freedom of one may completely fill; and hence there is a mutual limitation, which may be known but not determined apriori.

§ 70. The strict law ought to restrain our freedom no more than equally with that of every other; but as to its particular application, the law cannot be completely stated. In general terms, it may be affirmed that unjust statutes originate in the extension of the law of a particular case, without prior generalization of the law by abstraction from its particular application.

Now if we make the law our motive, in any particular indeterminate case we shall rather yield more than is just than less; and the greater our desire to adhere strictly to the law, the more we shall yield, lest unwittingly we do not yield enough. This is legally beneficence and in the eyes of men meritorious (§ 10); but ethically it is no more than duty (being the avoidance of a possible transgression), and indicates MORAL WORTH. In stating others as the '(material and practical) ends of our will, we therefore merely adopt a maxim for the moral-practical application of the law: "**make the humanity of others thine end.**" If we truly work for the happiness of all, we shall never unjustly limit the freedom of any.

§ 71. The further deduction of particular duties, whether legal or moral, whether determinate apriori or indeterminate except upon presentation (in concreto, together with all for-

eign elements entering into any given case), contains no difficulty. And since elaboration has nowhere herein been our design (*intelligitur plus quam pingitur*, as of old by APPELLES), we may here pause. But there is one point which it may be well to illustrate:

He who endeavors so far as lies in his power to advance the humanity of all others and who is attentive not to permit his own person to be abused by any other, may nevertheless inconsiderately suppose that it is not unlawful for himself to make use of his own humanity as a bare means toward the attainment of his own minor ends (*ex gratia, sensuous pleasure*). But if he truly desires to obey the universal law of his own reason, he must reflect no less in this than in any instance whether his maxim can be constituted the universal rule of mankind. He who desires to please himself by (for example) masturbation, may justly urge that he is not restraining the freedom of any other, and may foolishly fancy that he is merely exercising his own, and that moreover not to the detriment of any. But such a man (not beast; for no creature less noble than man is capable of such ignominy) must know that if all men were to act in like manner, the inevitable consequence would be the physical and intellectual deterioration and ultimate extinction of the rational race, and thereby the avoidance of the law of reason and the defeat of any possible end of the law. And though he were so far to restrain himself as apparently not to injure his physical nature, his "ethical must without stop fade away and utterly perish." The will sensuously determined is not and cannot be free; and he who voluntarily blots out of the sum-total of universal freedom his own individual freedom, is more base than any slave.

As a doctrine, therefore, the formulation of the law in this view becomes: "**make thine own humanity thine own absolute end.**"

§ 72. We ought now to understand the drift and significance of these weighty words of KANT, in the critique of practical reason:

"Autonomy of will is the sole foundation of morality and of the duties springing from it; and every other principle whatsoever not only cannot found laws of necessary obliga-

tion and catholic extent, but is in fact subversive of morality. In being independent of the matter of any law (a desired object), and in being determinable by the legislative form of his own maxims, consists the ethical nature of man, and is that which renders him a subject for morality: that independence is freedom negatively, while this self-legislation is freedom positively. The moral law expresses therefore nothing else than just the autonomy of reason (*id est*, of a man's freedom or spontaneity); and this autonomy or freedom is a condition which must qualify every maxim, if these last are to harmonize with the moral law itself. On the contrary, when the matter of a volition (which can be nothing else than the object of a desire) is made part of the practical law and represented as a condition prerequisite to its possibility, then heteronomy (a false principle of morals) results; and the will ceases to prescribe to itself its own law and is left exposed to laws taken from pathological phenomena. In this case, however, the maxim adopted by the will is formally unfit for law universal; and not only founds no obligation, but goes to subvert the principles of practical reason itself, and so militates against genuine moral sentiments, even while the actions emanating from such heteronomy are not wanting in conformity to the law."

§ 73. The attempt to demonstrate the logical science of philosophic truth *in more geometrico* ever has been and must continue so far failure as to be nearly useless. While it may readily be admitted that all sensible schemata are irreducible into images (the latter being by virtue of determination totally inadequate to the former), it is nevertheless to be considered that the imagery of pure space contains no foreign admixture; and the determined example, immediately evident in intuition, admits no sources of error into the determination and is so far adequate to the rule as to constitute and exhibit complete certainty.

Very differently, impure material instances (subsumed under intelligible principles deduced through sensible schemata) involve in every exhibition in concreto so extensive and incalculable foreign elements, that (though they may much assist defective judgment) their impurities and uncertainties are with difficulty abstracted from, and for the most part are liable to be reflected into the formulation and to vitiate the representation of the *a priori* principle itself. In the single consideration of the radical difference between pure sense

and pure intellect is to be found the ultimate ground of the reasons—

I. Why mathematics is the apriori science first evolved by the human intellect, and now and ever must be the most completely deduced and elaborated.

II. Why the special pursuit of the mathematic science unfits the mind in general for the practical concerns of life and in particular for philosophic inquiry.

III. Why the deductions of philosophy, certainly determinable in the sensible world, must take the form of generalizations and can rarely be in any great extent satisfactorily presented in particular application. (By all which is not signified that experimental subsumptions are subjectively indeterminate or practically unsatisfactory; but only that theoretical applications of apriori deductions cannot be extensively determined by way of scientific doctrine.)

IV. Why popular expositions of philosophy are of little value, obscuring its abstractions and confusing its method, without thereby bringing them within the uneducated comprehension.

V. Why moral duties (offices of virtue) are chiefly of indeterminate extent and application, and cannot properly be otherwise stated.

The true end and aim of the virtuous philosopher must therefore ever be to teach the teachers of men; and he neither can nor ought to expect other than very mediate practical results (in human progress) from the most profound and earnest effort.

§ 74. Philosophy can never reconstitute the phenomenal character of reason, nor enter upon any inquiry as to the cause or occasion of its constitution, but may only venture to exhibit it as it is, and to search out and insist upon the true method of its regulation (§ 53) and advancement. No mathematical calculation can eliminate from existence in external relation the correlations and interrelations of coexistence; nor (since the finite can be no otherwise developed than out of the INFINITE) is it possible that the foreign elements introduced by correlation should be (however approximately, nevertheless never) completely calculated. Herein lie the practical fallacies of Spinozism.

§ 75. By way of diversion, we may observe that the speculative (§ 31) fallacy of SPINOZA's system may be itself stated mathematically: if the relation of a part to a whole is not known, the most exhaustive knowledge of the part is (not merely not a complete knowledge of the whole, but) no knowledge whatever of the whole. Science dare not include the ABSOLUTE, the INFINITE, the UNCONDITIONED, in any other sense than as the original ground and ultimate completion of the relative, the finite, the limited: which latter cannot even be held the knowable member of a disjunctive proposition, but must be reverently regarded as included in, constituted by, and ever manifestly regulated by the ineffable former and originary. (§ 54.)

§ 76. Since however there are many minds which most readily seize the points of a simulated (quasi) mathematical method, and since the great KANT himself has seen fit to pursue to a limited extent the same course, we proceed here to collect (without demonstration) the more relevant positions hereinbefore involved or otherwise stated:

I. DEFINITION (by KANT).—Practical principles are propositions containing different rules, subordinate to them, which may be grounds of determining the will. They are either subjective, and are called maxims, when the rule is considered as of force only in reference to the thinking subject himself; or they are objective, and are called laws, when reason pronounces the rule to have an ethical virtue of obliging all reasonable beings. (§ 48.)

II. PROPOSITION (by KANT).—All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter chosen) as a determinator of the will, are one and all of them taken from experience and observation, and (being aposteriori) cannot supply a law of acting. (§ 54.)

III. PROPOSITION (by KANT).—All material practical principles, however different, agree in this: that they belong to one general system of eudaimonism and rest on self-love. The pleasure arising from the representation of the existence of a thing, when it is a determinator of the choice toward that thing, rests on the susceptibility of the individual and depends on the existence of the thing; and belongs for this reason to the sensory and not to the understanding, because this last refers a representation to the object by the intervention of a notion, and does not refer it to the subject by the intervention of a feeling. The pleasure is consequently only in so far practical, as the agreeable sensation expected by the

individual (from the object) determines his choice. But the consciousness of agreeable sensations, regarded as uninterrupted during the whole course of life, constitutes happiness; and the ruling principle to make regard to one's own happiness the supreme and single determination to action, is the principle which is justly called self-love.

IV. COROLLARY (by KANT).—Every material rule assigns a determination of choice taken from the lower powers [stimulated by the pleasures or pains of sense] of desire singly; and were there no FORMAL law of the will sufficient to determine it, it would needs follow that there existed no superior power [stimulated by pure reason] of desire at all. (§ 55.)

V. APODICT, generalized from experience.—Every finite intelligent agent has a rule of right and wrong (the moral law). (§§ 20, 61.)

VI. PROPOSITION, completely abstracting from all aposteriori matter and also from all sensible form (§ 34).—The law of reason is one and the same law. (Reason in genere being one and the same reason.) (§ 56.)

VII. COROLLARY.—No maxim unfit for law universal can possibly rest upon and be deduced from the moral law (which is the sole universal legislative form of the pure intellect). (§ 62.)

VIII. PROPOSITION (by KANT).—If an intelligent cogitates his maxims as practical laws of catholic extent, he can do so solely when his maxim is (not by its matter, but) by its form the determinator of volition. The matter of any practical principle is the object or end willed; and this end either determines the will or it does not. If the matter chosen regulates the choice, then the rule depends on the relation subsisting betwixt the feelings (of pleasure and pain) and the end represented (*id est*, on an aposteriori condition); and so the rule is unfit for a practical law (§ 4). But when the matter of a law is taken away, there remains nothing except the form of law in general. (§ 54.)

IX. PROBLEM (by KANT).—Upon the hypothesis that a maxim is solely by its legislative form the only valid determinator of choice: to find the nature of a will so determinable.

Since the abstract form of law in genere is cogitable by the force of reason singly, it is nowhat objected to the senses, and so no phenomenon occurring in space and time; and the idea of it, considered as a determinator of will, is wholly different in kind from the determinators of phenomena in the physical system, because in this last the determinator of a phenomenon is (by the law of the causal nexus) itself also always a phenomenon. Again: since by hypothesis no determinator of will is valid as law except the universal legislative

form, it follows that such a will is quite independent of the causal law by which phenomena are regulated. But to be independent of the law of cause and effect and of the mechanism of the physical system, is freedom in the strictest sense of the word.

A will, therefore, whose sole law is the legislative form of its maxims, is a free will. (§ 30.)

X. PROBLEM (by KANT).—Upon the hypothesis that a will is free: to find the law alone fit for its necessary determinator.

Since the matter of any practical law (*id est*, the object of a maxim) can only be given *a posteriori*; and the will is by hypothesis unaffected by any conditions *a posteriori*, and free, and yet cannot be cogitated as devoid of all law (§ 56): it remains that the free will must find in the law somewhat fit for its regulation, irrespective of the matter of the law. But when the matter of a law is taken away, there remains nothing except its legislative form.

The legislative form, therefore, contained in a maxim, is that which can alone determine a free will. (§ 30.)

XI. PROPOSITION.—The pure idea of a legislative form can be realized in sense (and so form part of a synthesis in the phenomenal world) only through a pure sensible schema. This schema must be a form which is in the sensible world as necessary and universal as the idea to be through it realized: hence no image and no particular determination, since none such would be adequate to the representation of the idea. (§ 59.)

XII. COROLLARY (from VI and XI).—The law of reason is realized through the abstract (pure sensible) form of the rational agent, her possessor and legislator. (§ 60.)

XIII. PROPOSITION.—The law, thus vitalized and represented as efficient, directs action (§§ 41, 47): So ACT as that thy maxims of will are fit for law universal (§ 62). No mere omission to do anything contrary to the law is complete obedience, or indeed any obedience whatever. The law is no less a rule of right than of wrong, and is either a law of action or no law (§ 55). What is RIGHT, that DO. (§ 57.)

XIV. PROPOSITION.—The law directs upon an end. For to act imports an aim and an end. (§§ 63, 64.)

XV. COROLLARY (from XIII and XIV).—The end of the law must be given in the law. Else were the command impractical and no more than empty words (§ 63). For to say that obedience is due to the mere form of the law is very just; but this implies no more than that there can be no question or choice of ends, not that there is no end (a conclusion repugnant to reason).

XVI. COROLLARY (from VI and XV).—The end of the moral law is one and the same end.

XVII. SCHOLIUM (from XIII and XV).—The form of the moral law, ordaining action in the world of sense, stated for the purpose of deducing from it particular duties (obligation toward particular ends), therefore becomes: Act with such ends in view as all rational agents must design. (§ 64.)

XVIII. COROLLARY (from XII and XVI).—No end less universal than the rational agent in genere is contained in the moral law. (§ 63.)

XIX. PROPOSITION.—The end of the moral law is the moral agent in genere (man). (§ 63.) “Make thine own humanity thine end.” (§ 71.)

XX. COROLLARY (from XVII and XIX).—Duties towards others are constituted upon the same basis as duties towards one's self. SCHOLIUM.—For their elucidation in general, abstraction must be made from all peculiarities and idiosyncrasies; since they can rest only upon the personal character as a rational agent. “Make the humanity of others thine end.” (§ 70.)

XXI. COROLLARY (from XVII and XIX).—Duties towards others ARE duties towards one's self. (Else they were not duties: q. e. d.)

XXII. COROLLARY (from XVII and XIX).—Duties toward one's self are of universal objective validity, and—SCHOLIUM—must be commanded by one's self (id est, their observance must be required from all rational agents). “So act that all mankind shall be compelled to respect thy person”—“Permit others to use thy humanity only as an absolute end.” (§ 65.)

XXIII. COROLLARY (from VII and XXII).—He who declares for himself the duties deduced from the moral law, declares them for all others, and constitutes himself a universal legislator. (§ 65.)

§ 77. If reason is sovereign, the subject who hears her voice thereupon immediately rests under obligation and has a duty to perform. (§ 20.) The obligation is expressed in the judgment that he OUGHT to perform the given duty. Obligation is therefore “the necessity of a free action” commanded by the law; and duty is the action commanded, “the matter of obligation.” Since in treating of law apriori we abstract from all matter (which can be supplied only by experience), duty in genere is no more than formal, a sort of schema cogitated as contained in obligation, which may be formulated thus: “The rational agent ought to obey his own supreme law”; and obligation becomes the duty of obedience to law.

It must not be supposed, however, that the power of reason

to enforce her law rests upon any such speculative and hypothetical OUGHT: exactly upon the contrary, the OUGHT is supported by the known power of reason, of which power it is the logical representative.

§ 78. But assuming that reason is sovereign, it follows that her law ought to and can subdue all opposing necessity of nature. And when the hundred-handed giants of sensuous appetite heap one upon another the mountains of use and habit, and from atop hurl stones into the kingdom of reason, although they escape destruction by the return (in accordance with the natural law) of these their weapons upon their own heads, they cannot escape the bolts of reason when she chooses to put forth her strength (§ 24). Every attempt to resist her power is followed inevitably by the terrific struggle which first reveals to man his freedom, and out of which alone is gathered virtue. But since this is a conflict between the ethical man and the phenomenal man, he knows that the will of the former is his very will, and that of the latter a deflected will misrepresenting and sinning against himself. The action of the one is therefore SELF-ACTION properly, and that of the other SELF-COUNTERACTION. And if reason for the more speedy reconquest of her rebellious empire calls in the help of sense against sense, and opposes to appetite extraneously determined (§ 45) an equally foreign determinator, whether a sensible habit of (acquired by) obedience, or pain resulting from contrasting her pure law with error, or advantage following upon due subjection and compliance: then an action so determined is SELF-CO-ACTION, the true man regarding the action (of his phenomenal self upon the one hand against his phenomenal self upon the other) as the act of an ally supporting his veritable self, and never as the act of an enemy.

§ 79. "The notion duty implies, in the very essence of it," says KANT, "the further notion necessitation, *id est*, co-action exercised by the law upon the choice; and this co-action may be either foreign or proper (self-command)." Now we know that liberty of choice consists in permitting the self-action of the law to overrule mechanical necessity. If any mechanical motive is allowed to rule, there is no liberty of choice. Hence, if duty essentially involves co-action

(whether foreign or proper, nevertheless mechanical), duty is irreconcilable with freedom.

§ 80. Strictly speaking, self-command is not of the nature of co-action : although it supplements and supports itself by co-action, the self commanded is not the self-commanding. Moral necessitation must be held to be action strictly, and not co-action. If the agent co-acts the moral necessitation by superadding to the representation of the law somewhat material as a counterbalance to such material action as is not in harmony with the law (*ex gratia*, the material benefit to result from adhering to the law), thereby counteracting the impure choice, he adds nothing to the duty to which he is obliged by reason, which duty is no more than obedience to law, and is completely fulfilled* by acting upon the pure representation of the law. Co-action may be foreign or proper (determined by a sensuous representation of subjective origin, or *ex gratia* by the penalty of a statute); but it cannot in either case be the naked representation of the law.

§ 81. Now as against a just co-action (whether foreign or proper) there may be called in (to the aid of the vicious material determination) an equally possible but contrary co-action, so styled from the phenomenal point of view: (*ex gratia*, a passion produced by reflection upon the "tyranny" of the law). But this co-action, operating against the representation of the law and in support of the unholy choice, is nothing moral. It is, however, this struggle against (rather than that in support of) moral necessitation, which is the most astonishing proof of freedom. (§ 45.)

§ 82. Since it is the MAN himself who (as it were instinctively) lays impediments in the way of his own ethical maxims, virtue ("the strength of the human will in the execution of duty") MAY BE REGARDED AS a self-counteraction, bringing sensuous feelings ("the moral sense") of intellectual origin ("conscience") to oppose mechanical determinators of the choice. But since it is the PERSON himself who lays these ethical impediments (moral sense) in the way of his own sensuously determined maxims (thereby adding to the

* The law cannot be completely fulfilled; but he who continually makes utmost effort to fulfil the law, thereby completely fulfils duty.

force of the naked idea duty), VIRTUE IS A SELF-CO-ACTION, "a command conducted upon a principle of inward freedom." (§ 53.)

§ 83. We discover, therefore, four species of action, all brought into exercise by the moral law; but only the one of which is the action of the law, constituted duty by the obligation of the law. These nice distinctions are really essential in science, and not merely hypercritical. For if we do not attend to them, if we do not complete our abstractions and clarify our terminology, we are continually liable to reflect upon abstract use some shadow of particular significance, obscuring (if not confounding) the argument. (§ 35.)

§ 84. And so it happens that KANT maintains that "all duty is necessitation (*id est*, co-action), even when it is self-action, conformably to a law; but whatever is done by constraint and co-action, that is not performed out of love." But duty MAY be performed out of love, and yet not cease to be duty; so that it MUST be performed. That which we would perform out of love we may omit without guilt, if so it be not at the same time duty. KANT is right in holding that love is not a duty; but he need not have urged that duty is not love.

And now we are fully prepared to understand that in ethics an end which directly results from the application of the law, (*ex gratia*, to love our neighbor as ourself) is obligatory, but only as end, never as a motive. That is, the (material and practical) end does not and cannot constitute the obligation, since that would vitiate the fountain of morality in its very source.

THOUGHTS ON LOGIC AND DIALECTIC.

Translated from the German of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER by CHARLES JOSEPHÉ.

[Chapter II. of the "Parerga" and "Paralipomena."]

§ 22. Every *general* truth is to the particular ones as gold is to silver, in that one can change it into a considerable number of particular truths, which follow from it, just as gold coin into